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C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000959

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO ISN/DAS ELIOT KANG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2019

TAGS: [PREL](#) [ENRG](#) [KNUC](#) [TU](#)

SUBJECT: TURKEY: GETTING PAST "NO" ON NEW NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS
GROUP ENRICHMENT GUIDELINES

REF: STATE 53878

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey for reason 1.4 (b, d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Our effort to persuade Turkey to change its view on supporting a "clean text" of guidelines on enrichment has continued after the Budapest NSG meeting in early June. Action Request: See Para. 7. End Summary

¶2. (C) DCM met with PM Erdogan's foreign policy advisor and IAEA Board Governor Hakan Fidan on June 23. ISN DAS Eliot Kang met with MFA Director General (and Turkey's future permrep to UNVIE) Tomur Bayer on June 30. Pol Mil Counselor met with MFA Deputy Director General Ahmet Gun on June 29. All pressed for Turkey to reconsider its stance at the NSG.

¶3. (C) Turkey's refusal thus far to accept new guidelines at the Nuclear Suppliers Group on enrichment technology is shaped largely by three factors:

- its resentment, based largely on nationalist sentiment, that other states (i.e. India, Argentina and Brazil) which have not been loyal NATO allies and NPT members for decades are being granted an exception or an exemption to prohibitions on transfer of enrichment technology;
- its incomplete policy on how Turkey plans to approach nuclear energy and whether it would be wise to close any doors before it develops a coherent policy; and
- lack of leadership at Turkey's Atomic Energy Agency (TAEK).

¶4. (C) No amount of diplomatic arm-twisting will change Turkey's stance in the short run (it's been tried). We suggest that for us to influence Turkey's policy and get Turkey's support for our goal of new restrictions on the transfer of enrichment technology, we need to take each of these factors into account.

¶5. (C) All of our Turkish interlocutors acknowledged that Turkey does not yet have a comprehensive policy for how it will develop nuclear energy generation capacity. Fidan told DCM that because TAEK Chairman Okay Cakiroglu had wielded broad authority on this issue before his very recent retirement, no Turkish officials at the senior policy levels had even educated themselves on the topic prior to NSA Jones' call to FM Davutoglu. As MFA Undersecretary Ertugrul Apakan told the Ambassador, a policy-level visit from Washington to discuss NSG issues could serve as an action-forcing event to prompt the inter-agency discussion within the GOT which would be required before any change in policy could take place.

¶6. (C) We would welcome a visit by Washington experts familiar with both the technical and political aspects of

this issue. DDG Ahmet Gun warned, however, that if such a visit were to take place before the policy review was complete, the delegation would receive the same fixed answer Turkey delivered in Budapest: no to articles six and seven. Gun hoped that the USG would be able to offer Turkey some sort of political recognition, a way that Turkey could keep a door open to seek some sort of special status, as it believes India, Brazil and Argentina now have. Fidan told DCM that perhaps it would be helpful to weave in some sort of guarantee that Turkey could be assured of acquiring nuclear fuel, even if Turkey should forego the right to seek enrichment technology, perhaps along the lines of the nuclear fuel bank proposal. All warned that any policy review would be difficult before the new leadership of TAEK is appointed.

Action Request

17. (C) We suggest that Washington agencies consider forming a group of policy and technical experts to visit Ankara. We recognize that time is short before the next NSG meeting in September, but caution against sending a group in July or early August, when the review process will still be incomplete. An early announcement of a visit to take place later in August, however, could help force the GOT to begin its policy review.

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JEFFREY